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Detecting Themes and Variations: The Use
of Cases in Developmental BiologyRachel A. Ankeny*yThis article unpacks a particular use of ‘cases’within developmental biology, namely as a
means of describing the typical or canonical patterns of phenomena. The article explores
how certain cases have come to be established within the ﬁeld and argues that although
they were initially selected for reasons of convenience or ease of experimental manipula-
tion, these cases come to serve as key reference points within the ﬁeld because of the epis-
temological structures imposed on them by the scientists using them and, hence, become
usable in a wider variety of circumstances including future theory development.
1. Introduction. Reasoning based on or with cases is often viewed as a
second-rate epistemological move, perhaps necessary in ‘soft science’ do-
mains in which phenomena are not as regular as in more ‘traditional’ sci-
entiﬁc ﬁelds thought to have fundamental laws underlying them or when
our abilities to derive generalizations are more limited due to features of the
domain under examination.1 Use of cases is ubiquitous within the social
sciences; however, although they are well recognized by practitioners in
*To contact the author, please write to: School of History and Politics, University of Adelaide,1. This caricature of the physical sciences has been undermined by various seminal works
notably Cartwright (1983); the distinction invoked here between types of science is none
thelessmaintained in discussions of the role of and need for cases in the social sciences (and
their status as a ‘poor stepsister’ to ‘more rigorous’ forms of scientiﬁc reasoning). It also
should be noted that issues discussed in this article also relate to the move to recognize the
heterogeneous range of scientiﬁc practices, many of which are not theory driven, and rec
ognition that theory-driven scientiﬁc practice is in fact quite atypical (thanks to Alan Love
for helping me clarify this point), but I do not have space to investigate the relationship be
tween cases and scientiﬁc practice here.
Adelaide 5005 SA, Australia; e-mail rachel.ankeny@adelaide.edu.au.
yMany thanks to the other participants and the attendees at the PSA symposium at which a very
early version of this article was ﬁrst presented, particularly Hasok Chang, Chris DiTeresi
MaryMorgan, and SandyMitchell. Useful comments were provided on the ﬁnal draft by Chris
DiTeresi, Elihu Gerson, Jane Maienschein, and especially Alan Love.
Philosophy of Science, 79 (December 2012) pp. 644–654. 0031-8248/2012/7905-0017$10.00
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those ﬁelds as an epistemic form, there is little consensus even among them
on what constitutes a case, how it is typically used, what reasoning processes
CASES IN DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 645underlie its use, and what gives its use warrant.2
Paying close attention to the formative stages of a ﬁeld that later can be-
come invisible (especially to those unaware of the ﬁeld’s history) allows us to
identify critical epistemic structures in the nonsocial sciences that appear to
share at least a family resemblance with cases in the social sciences.3 These
also are often labeled as ‘cases’ (or ‘case studies’) by their scientiﬁc users but
have had limited conceptual or philosophical attention paid to them, either by
scientiﬁc practitioners or scholars within the history and philosophy of sci-
ence.4 Hence, as part of a broader investigation of how reasoning with cases
functions within the biological/biomedical sciences, this article unpacks a
particular use of cases within developmental biology, namely, as a means of
describing the typical or canonical patterns of phenomena. Why choose de-
velopmental biology for this exploration of cases? Cases seem to have strong
resonance in those scientiﬁc domains in which variation is rife, or at least is
relevant to the research questions under examination and is of interest to
practitioners, and developmental biology clearly ﬁts this description.
The article thus explores how certain cases have come to be established as
central or critical within developmental biology.5 They involve in-depth, of-
ten extremely descriptive studies of some type of delimited unit (usually a
particular strain of a species) with the goal of eventually elucidating norms
or baseline patterns against which newly observed yet similar phenomena
(e.g., in other species) can be compared.6 I argue that although these cases
were initially selected for reasons of convenience or ease of experimental ma-
nipulation (among other reasons that might be viewed as nonsystematic or
even nonscientiﬁc), they come to serve as key reference pointswithin the ﬁeld
because of the epistemological structures imposed on them by the scientists
2. Compare, e.g., Ragin and Becker (1992), Yin (1994), Gerring (2004), and George and3. In my view, ‘theory development’ is given too high a status as the imprimatur of sci-
entiﬁcmaturitymore generally, but examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this
article.
4. On the distinction between cases and case studies, see Morgan (2012). Discussions of
cases in other areas of science but not development biology in particular include Forrester
(1996), Ankeny (2005, 2011), Creager, Lunbeck, and Wise (2007), and Gabbani (2010),
and in history and philosophy of science, Burian (2001) and Lennox (2011). For a related
discussion on ‘types’ in developmental biology, see DiTeresi (2010).
5. The examples have been selected to raise a diversity of issues relating to the use of
cases and are not intended to be historically representative of the ﬁeld in any sense.
6. Note the similarity of this description to Gerring’s deﬁnition of a case study in political
science: “in-depth study of a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) where the
scholar’s aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena” (2004, 341).
Bennett (2005), to name but a few standard sources within the voluminous literature.
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who discover or propose them and, hence, become usable in awider variety of
circumstances including future theory development.7 In some instances, a
646 RACHEL A. ANKENYcase becomes recognized as such because of its typicality, and other examples
show that atypical examples sometimes come to be established (and main-
tained by practitioners within the ﬁeld) as cases.
But why bother to analyze these reasoning structures in terms of cases?
Are these not just Kuhn’s well-worn ‘exemplars’ in a different guise? When
Kuhn introduced this concept in his postscript to the second edition of Struc-
ture (1970), he stressed that in substituting it for ‘paradigm’, he meant it to
refer to “the concrete problem-solutions that students encounter from the
start of their scientiﬁc education, whether in laboratories, on examinations,
or at the ends of chapters in science texts” (187). Hence, there are two obvi-
ous differences between the developmental biology cases that I propose to
examine and Kuhnian ‘exemplars’: ﬁrst, I have not selected these examples
because of their retrospective, pedagogical signiﬁcance, although they may
indeed later serve this purpose; however, even in these cases they simulta-
neously provide a baseline or norm for both nonexpert users such as students
and professionals in the ﬁeld pursuing further lines of research.8 More im-
portantly, although cases in developmental biology are concrete (perhaps in
a wetter and more visceral way than Kuhn imagined in his examples of in-
clined planes and calorimeters), they cannot be easily viewed as ‘problem-
solutions’, not in the least part because they are often not proposed in response
to a speciﬁc puzzle or problem of the type envisioned by Kuhn. Instead, as
will be shown, cases in developmental biology are often highly detailed and
descriptive, establishing themes (as it were) that can be used as the basis for
articulating variations and, hence, are ampliative in intent.9
2. The Chicken as a (Classic) Case of Developmental Anatomy. The
chicken (Gallus gallus) has been used as the basis for studying development
from ancient times. The so-called laws or principles put forward by Karl
Ernst von Baer in the late 1820s (1828–37), which are probably more appro-
7. This line of argument is similar to that made with regard to the use of organisms as
‘model organisms’ in twentieth-century biology (on developmental biology, the key ref-
erence is Bolker [1995]; see also Gest 1995); see Ankeny and Leonelli (2011) for a phil-
osophically oriented analysis.
8. Both for simplicity and to document that these are indeed shared cases as recognized
by practitioners in the ﬁeld, I sometimes use examples taken from the most recent edi-
tions of textbooks typically viewed as the standards within the ﬁeld (e.g., Gilbert 2010;
Wolpert et al. 2011) as well as contemporary review articles in the scholarly research
literature of the ﬁeld, at the same time as providing historical context for the origins of
these cases.
9. I am grateful to Eli Gerson for this term; for a related discussion on the use of ‘descrip-
tive’ models in biology, see Ankeny (2000).
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priately considered to be generalizations about developmental patterns, were
initially derived from chick development in comparison with other verte-
CASES IN DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 647brates: for instance, early embryos have more similar structures and features
early in development, as general features tend to appear ﬁrst, and then di-
vergence occurs as development progresses andmore specialized features de-
velop. These patterns (few would still call them ‘laws’) continue to be pre-
sented as in some sense ‘elements of the truth’ (e.g., Arthur 2002, 757),
but it has been shown that they hold more precisely for comparisons made
among organismswith approximately the same level of phenotypic complex-
ity, such as different vertebrate classes. However, by examining a wider range
of vertebrate species, it also has been shown that there is muchmore variation
in these developmental patterns than previously recognized or described.10
Of course thisﬁnding should not come as a surprise, given that the chicken
was clearly selected for convenience and ease of experimentation (e.g., em-
bryonic observations can be made by making a window in the eggshell, and
chick embryos are robust even when surgically manipulated) rather than any
indication that its development was ‘typical’ in any sense. From a strictly
biological point of view, the chick easily could be argued to be marginal
to tracing evolution of development, which illustrates a more general trend:
“modern textbooks [in developmental biology] rarely consider species other
than the common laboratory animals. . . . Developmental biologists use just
a small number of laboratory species as model systems, and are therefore
unfamiliar with the diversity of embryonic form in vertebrates” (Richardson
et al. 1997, 93, 95; cf. Bolker 1995).
Nonetheless the chicken has served (and continues to serve) as a key case
or anchor point for much ongoing developmental research into the variations
on developmental themes: even (and especially) those investigations that
seek to refute or complicate von Baer’s principles go back to the chicken as
part of any extensive comparative examination. In addition, due in part to the
inclusion of the chicken genome in large-scale sequencing projects, it has be-
come a modern ‘model organism’ that continues to be used in research on
general vertebrate development.11 Alongwith perhaps lancelets (amphioxus),
sea urchins, and the frog (see below), the chicken remains a key case in de-
velopmental biology, in large part due to its historical importance in the pro-
cesses of articulating principles of development.10. See, e.g., Richardson et al. (1997); on the chicken in particular in comparison to other
vertebrates, see table 3, 103.
11. Use of chicken models is more limited than some other model organisms for various
biological and technical reasons; for a review of one type of developmental research us-
ing chickens, and the rationalization of it as a model for vertebrates, see, e.g., Tickle
(2004).
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3. The Frog as a Case of the Life Cycle. One of the centerpieces of devel-
opmental biology has been the articulation of the processes by which a fer-
648 RACHEL A. ANKENYtilized zygote develops into an adult organism, and these processes are typ-
ically articulated by division into a temporal series of what are sometimes
termed ‘fundamental’ events or transitions in the life cycle: fertilization,
cleavage, gastrulation, organogenesis, metamorphosis, and gametogene-
sis.12 These events occur in some form in all members of a species and indeed
can be projected beyond a particular species to others, although the ways in
which the development events occur might differ considerably.13
The articulation of the developmental stages of ‘the frog’ (by which is
usually meant the African clawed frog Xenopus laevis) is often presented in
textbooks as the classic case of the life cycle within descriptive embryology,
involving the six main processes outlined above. The frog often is claimed to
provide an example of a ‘representative’ life cycle that can be generalized to
other species of frog and even to other taxa. Then on the basis of this standard
case or instance, variations are detailed, so, for instance, gametogenesis be-
gins at different times during development, depending on the species; fertil-
ization methods differ (in some species fertilization occurs externally rather
than internally); and so on.
Metamorphosis also is often illustrated using a ‘generic’ frog; the abstract
description of this life stage typically makes note of the status of frogs as one
of the classic cases providing the baseline or the typical features in compari-
son to which the variant forms that this process takes can be articulated. As
a multiauthored article investigating the concept in its comparative context
noted, metamorphosis is “[a] biological process generally attributed to a
subset of animals: most famously insects and amphibians . . . (think cater-
pillar to butterﬂy)” (Bishop et al. 2006, 655). Since metamorphosis is a pro-
cess shared across these types of organisms, the speciﬁc species is not im-
portant to deﬁne when talking about the generic case.
However, beyond very widespread consensus about these classic cases
of metamorphosis, there has been limited agreement on how to understand
the range of variations of the process, for instance, whether the term ‘meta-
morphosis’ can rightly be applied to nonanimals such as fungi, ﬂowering
plants, and marine algae (Bishop et al. 2006, 655). The obvious response
is that it depends on how ‘metamorphosis’ is deﬁned, but this debate is not12. In some species, these stages are given numbers or other designators, as in the stan-
dardized stages of development of the chick embryo dating back to, e.g., Hamburger and
Hamilton (1951), but the basic processes remain the same, which is the key point neces-
sary for my argument.
13. For a survey of these issues and their philosophical implications, see Love (2008).
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directly relevant for this article.14 What is critical is that several species of
frog are repeatedly invoked as the classic example of metamorphosis (along
CASES IN DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 649with sea urchins, butterﬂies, and Drosophila) and are used as the basis for
seeking ‘deep mechanistic similarities’ among independently evolved life
cycle transitions.
A second key point to note is that although articulation of various devel-
opmental stages obviously involves judgments about typicality (i.e., what
makes something a case of metamorphosis), in contrast the details of the pro-
cesses of metamorphosis sometimes provide cases of atypicality. So during
metamorphosis in Xenopus, the eyes move to the front of the head from their
previous location on the side, and new neuronal pathways are formed, allow-
ing input from both eyes to reach the same area of the brain, a process that is
typical in frogs (Cannatella and de Sa 1993). These pathways involve not
just the remodeling of existing neurons but formation of new neurons that
differentiate in response to thyroid hormones. This ﬁnding can be used as the
basis for investigations about these processes in other organisms, so mam-
mals have the same proteins in the optic chiasm (but ﬁsh and birds do not).
This latter variation does not in any sense invalidate the use of Xenopus or
even the generic frog as a classic case of metamorphosis but instead provides
a structure for understanding what is critical or essential to terming some life
stage ‘metamorphosis’ and what can be deemed a ‘variation on the theme’.15
4. The Insect as a Case of Diapause. Diapause involves the suspension of
development for some time period (a sort of developmental hibernation or
‘suspended animation’), and in insects it can occur in the embryonic, larval,
pupal, or adult stage, depending on the species. Examples include the over-
wintering of eggs by hickory aphids in early development, by the silkworm
moth (Bombyx mori) as an embryo, or by the gypsymoth (Lymantria dispar)
as a larva.16 These dramatic developmental delays typically are not physio-
14. See Bishop et al. (2006) for one set of answers from practitioners about the key ele-
ments of metamorphosis, noting the range of arguments and understandings among even
this small (but diverse) group of scientists. These biologists work on a range of organisms,
which in turn inﬂuences their understandings of the concept and what is held to be the un-
derlying ‘generic’ case, particularly because of critical differences between organisms
that change their body plan organization, such as insects and those that do not (e.g., many
marine invertebrates). I am grateful to Alan Love for raising this point, but I do not have
space to explore this issue here.
15. As noted previously, what counts as the classic case and what then becomes a vari-
ation have been decisions loaded with historical contingency: for implications of this
point for developmental biology, see esp. Bolker (1995).
16. A classic article is Andrewartha (1952); for general background, see review articles
by Tauber and Tauber (1976), Kostal (2006), and Denlinger (2008).
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logical responses but are induced by stimuli or early cues that come in ad-
vance of environmental changes. They allow the organism to survive epi-
650 RACHEL A. ANKENYsodic harsh conditions to cope with seasonally ﬂuctuating resources and are
common among species in habitats that undergo severe winters. Diapause is
facultative in some species, occurring only when induced by environmental
conditions, while the diapause period has become an obligatory part of the
life cycles in other species.
Cases of diapause in insects allowed articulation of the general concepts
now associated with diapause: (1) it is a dynamic, not static, state; (2) length
of daylight and temperature are the major environmental factors that help to
maintain diapauses; (3) although these factors are regulatory, few species re-
quire speciﬁc stimuli to break diapauses; (4) interspecies variation occurs
with regard to the speciﬁcs of the processes; and (5) within species, there
is considerable interpopulation and intrapopulation variation in the duration
of diapause. Over 100 mammalian species undergo diapause in different
forms, with common strategies including delayed fertilization with storage
of sperm for later use and delayed implantation of the blastocyst.17 Diapause
in mammals is induced and broken with the speciﬁc control mechanisms
varying widely from lactational to seasonal cues, various sorts of hormones,
or changes in length of day or nutrition. Even though the mechanisms differ,
the basic format is the same: the gestation period is lengthened, and off-
spring are born at more appropriate times (in the case of marsupials, e.g.,
when there is not a newborn still nursing), in more hospitable seasons, or
when resources or conditions otherwise improve.
Several points can be made about the way in which insects have served as
the key case for understanding the category of diverse events grouped under
‘diapause’. First, the term clearly has been extended from insects to describe
a very wide range of loosely related phenomena that in short are instances of
dramatic developmental delays, but of course embryonic diapauses of the
types that occur in mammals do not occur in insects. In addition, diapause
has evolved independently in a number of different species (Renfree and
Shaw 2000). Hence in this example, insects as ‘cases’ of diapause likely are
not pointing to shared underlying genetic mechanisms but instead to other
sorts of physiological patterns in relation to ecological and environmental
facts.
Second, the classic cases of diapause in insects that have been well stud-
ied are not associated with the typical model organisms, notablyDrosophila,
which does not undergo very impressive diapause (it requires quite low tem-
peratures near the developmental threshold for diapause to occur; see Saun-
ders, Henrich, andGilbert 1989). However, more recently, it might be argued17. A useful review article on diapauses in mammals is Renfree and Shaw (2000).
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that the traditional focus on insects has been displaced by the study of dia-
pause in the dauer larval stage of the nematode Caenorhabiditis elegans
CASES IN DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 651(Cassada and Russell 1975), especially because its genetic mechanisms can
be characterized much more easily and because of its status as a model or-
ganism.18 For our purposes, the key point is that what serves as a baseline or
case in a particular context is often dictated by a range of historical and bi-
ological contingencies and differs depending on the question or develop-
mental theme of interest.19
5. The Nematode as a Case of Programmed Cell Death. ‘Cell suicide’,
or more formally programmed cell death (PCD) or apoptosis, is a normal de-
velopmental process required to maintain the appropriate number of cells: it
is responsible for ‘pruning’ unnecessary structures such as the tails of frogs
or mammary tissue in males), the formation of complex organs (e.g., ﬁngers
where interdigital cell death allows their separation), and more generally
controlling the number of cells present in particular tissue types (e.g., the
nervous system in vertebrates).20 One of the pathways for apoptosis was ﬁrst
described in the nematode C. elegans. It was demonstrated that 131 cells die
reproducibly (and 959 somatic cells come from the egg), and the process is
controlled by a unique set of genes (Moyed Ellis and Horvitz 1986). These
ﬁndings allowed related genes with similar functions in Drosophila and hu-
mans to be identiﬁed; although the apoptotic pathway ismuchmore complex
in mammals, it uses the same basic components, and one of the signaling
pathways is evolutionarily well conserved even in the plant kingdom (see
Solomon et al. 1999).
In the example of C. elegans as a case of PCD, again experimental sim-
plicity (in this case particularly the small number of cells, their ease of vi-
sualization, and their invariant lineage) and historical contingency (De
Chadarevian 1998; Ankeny 2001) were critical features that allowed it to
become established and canonical. It is the centerpiece of nearly all text-
book discussions and most research papers on PCD that provide any histor-
ical background before presentation of their ﬁndings, regardless of whether
an explicit comparison within the research is being made to ﬁndings in C.
elegans.18. I am grateful to Alan Love for emphasizing this.
19. However, some researchers have noted that the lack of use of insect model organisms
has hindered progress in the ﬁeld, particularly for articulating underlying genetic or mo-
lecular mechanisms of diapause (e.g., Denlinger 2008).
20. The best general text on the topic is Green (2011); for early use of the term ‘pro-
grammed cell death’, see Lockshin and Williams (1964); and from a clinical point of
view, see Hotchkiss et al. (2009).
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6. Discussion andConclusion. Sowhat is a case in developmental biology,
and what purposes does it serve? The (admittedly extremely limited) exam-
652 RACHEL A. ANKENYples clearly illustrate that many cases come to be identiﬁed as such because
of their historic primacy or importance, and often the data or information
that were generated from these cases resulted from the ease of experimental
tractability, manipulability, or similarity provided by the organism in ques-
tion in relation to the process or issue under examination. This point high-
lights a fundamental difference between these cases and model organisms
more generally: not all of the cases discussed above are used for wider-scale
examinations into developmental or genetic processes, as is the basis for
modern model organism research.21 Oftentimes they serve as a focal point
within the ﬁeld (a baseline ‘theme’) against which additional examples
(‘variations’) can be articulated but only with regard to a narrowly deﬁned
topic of interest, such as a particular developmental stage or phenomenon.
These cases, hence, are similar to what social scientists call ‘critical cases’,
which allow generalizations and projection to other instances involving the
same or similar phenomena. They provide a key part of the solution to the
practical and coordinative problem of ‘taming variation’ (DiTeresi 2010) in
the phenomena of interest.
Second, the cases explored above show that important trade-offs exist be-
tween typical and atypical cases. Most of the examples discussed were ini-
tially used in the ﬁeld as ‘typical cases’ (if only by default because more in-
formation was available about them than other examples) and hence served
as touchstones for the ﬁeld as it continued to develop. However, as research
progressed on similar phenomena in different species, it became clear that
some of these cases were in fact atypical, extreme, or marginal in some way,
but yet the original cases continued to provide critical information because
they permitted investigation of variations in phenomena or processes that
had been identiﬁed or even deﬁned by use of the case in the ﬁrst instance.22
What is the epistemological ‘payoff’ of thinking in cases in this domain?
Here, returning to the literature on cases in the social sciences is again useful:
Gerring notes that “the case study method is correctly understood as a par-
ticular way of deﬁning cases, not a way of analyzing cases or a way of mod-
eling causal relations” (2004, 341). As we have seen in the examples above,
there is no one way in which the cases are analyzed, nor are there uniform
causal models underlying them (indeed, they are relatively devoid of claims
21. See Ankeny and Leonelli (2011) for an expansion of this point with regard to the dis-
tinction between experimental organisms and model organisms.
22. Because of space limitations, I do not explore the implications of these issues in terms
of the philosophical literature on the uses (and limits) of idealization and abstraction;
some important issues are raised relating to idealization in this domain by Love (2009,
2010) among others.
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about causal relations, at least in the earliest stages of their use). Instead, as
this article has attempted to show, these cases exist at a fairly early stage (not
CASES IN DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 653temporally, but in terms of a chain of reasoning) in the practices of develop-
mental biology, and a critical move occurs each time one of them is explicitly
deﬁned or implicitly used as a case.
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